The E-Bomb Threat and WMD Terrorism

As counterterrorism officials expressed growing concerns over a possible NRBC (Nuclear, Radiological, Biological, Chemical) terrorist attack, they tell almost no word about the possible use of an E-Bomb (Electromagnetic Bomb) by terrorists. The ISRIA was investigating this threat and listened to claims saying that such a device could be built for ~$500 approx. As a result, it asked an expert to answer specific questions about a threat that doesn't draw the attention it deserves. E-Bomb is a non-conventional threat Counterterrorism officials must be ready to deal with. Because 'they have to know', the ISRIA made this special interview (2343 words) with Australia-based Dr. Carlo Kopp, a prominent expert in Computer Sciences and Information Warfare.

 

1. More about Dr. Carlo Kopp. - up

 

Dr Carlo Kopp authored a series of papers dealing with the strategic impact of the E-bomb during the mid 1990s, and coined the term E-bomb. He currently lectures Computer Science topics, including Information Warfare, at Monash University, is a Research Fellow in regional military strategy at Monash Asia Institute, and is editor and cofounder of the Air Power Australia think tank. An experienced computer industry design engineer, he holds a PhD in Computer Science, an MSc in Computer Science and a BE(Hons) in Electrical Engineering. He remains an active researcher in Information Warfare and is credited with coauthoring the fundamental information theory models which underpin game theoretical and mathematical treatment of this research area.. His original 1995 E-bomb paper for the US Air Force has been translated into multiple languages, including Russian (Russian Translation Part 1, Russian Translation Part 2).

 

2. What's an E-Bomb? How does it work? What consequences? - up

 

The term E-bomb is a general classifier for all electromagnetic bombs, be they flux generator based low frequency weapons, or the plethora of various microwave bomb designs which are feasible. As a formal definition, any non-nuclear bomb which produces its primary damage effect by the use of electromagnetic fields or waves qualifies as an 'E-bomb'.

The idea behind all E-bombs is that the weapon, when initiated, emits a very high power burst of electromagnetic energy which damages or destroys any unshielded or unprotected electronic devices within the weapon's lethal footprint. How big that footprint might be, and how severe the damage effects might be, depends specifically on the type of E-bomb, its power rating, and its mode of deployment, as well as the characteristics of the target set. It is worth observing that prediction of E-bomb lethality is in many respects more difficult than lethality predictions for conventional bombs, since the electromagnetic hardness of targets can vary enormously, and coupling of energy into targets often defies easy analytical prediction.

If an E-bomb is used in an urban area, it will couple energy into targets in two ways. The first is frontdoor coupling, via antennas on mobile or wireless devices,  the second way is backdoor coupling, via network cables, mains power wiring and telephone wiring, but also via cooling grilles and air gaps in computer or other electronic equipment chassis. Once the energy is coupled into an electronic device or computer, it causes electrical damage effects to semiconductor components, not unlike lightning strike damage.

The consequences of a properly designed E-bomb used against an urban area, within its lethal footprint, would be the mass destruction of all electronic and computer equipment, and latent or intermittent electrical faults in equipment not destroyed electrically. The latter can be more devastating insofar as significant manpower would be required to isolate and repair such faults. Given the complete dependency of modern information age economies on digital hardware, the E-bomb effectively winds the clock back for its victims, to the pre-electronic era.

 

3. Most officials talk about a possible NRBC (Nuclear, Radiological, Biological, Chemical) terrorist attack but never tell a word about terrorists using an E-Bomb someday. Why? Is that because an Attack using E-bomb is unlikely? - up

 

The absence of electromagnetic attack in the lexicon of most contemporary security agencies, officials and legislators is not related to the possession or non-possession of such weapons by terrorists. Rather, the long and painful experience of all analysts in this area indicates that it is a consequence of abject and often complete illiteracy on the subject of electromagnetic attack and its consequences, on the part of the government and corporate bureaucratic communities. This might sound like a grand generalisation, but the empirical evidence after ten years is beyond dispute.

Some years ago this analyst canvassed the issue with the head of technology services for a major bank. His response was direct - 'you want some overpaid consultancy for something which will never happen'. Colleagues in the US have experienced similar rebuttals from senior officials in government bureaucracies and corporate management, in a range of industry or security areas. The only entities which have shown genuine interest in this issue are the US and UK military, who have made some investment in prototyping weapons, and in the former instance, performing vulnerability assessments on some equipment types.

The institutional resistance to the idea that our digital world could be crippled by a modest investment in 1950s technology weapons is remarkable, and has led more than one of my colleagues to conclude that it would take Winn Schwartau's 'electronic Pearl Harbour' to budge. I am certain that there is a social sciences or psychology PhD to be had from the study of this observable phenomenon. The nearest comparison is the pre-WW2 institutional resistance of most navies to the idea that aircraft could defeat battleships. As the war in the Pacific proved conclusively, no amount of wishful thinking could change the march of technological evolution.

In terms of assessing the likelihood of a terrorist attack using this class of weapons, it is extremely difficult to do so without hard and specific operational intelligence of the typically classified variety. For such an attack to take place, a terrorist needs to possess such a weapon, deliver it into position, and know how to use it effectively. Having the intelligence to assess likelihoods for all three phases of an attack is problematic, given the nature of the problem. As the UK learned through bitter experience, splinter groups of terrorists can be difficult to penetrate and their actions difficult to predict.

 

4. Some media claimed an E-Bomb can be built for ~$500 only. Is that true? - up

 

The basic materials for building a flux generator bomb are indeed available, without restrictions other than the explosive filler, and could be acquired for such a sum. This is not an overstatement. Copper tubing, solid copper heavy gauge wire, nylon for spacers, high voltage capacitors are all readily available.  PVC sewage pipes make for great backyard mandrels to make up windings.
The principal obstacle to backyard E-bombs or 'suburban garage specials' is the absence of design documentation for a proven and working design. A flux generator may be simple to construct, but the design of such devices has historically been the domain of nuclear weapons research labs in the US and USSR. The required expertise to do the design is the main barrier to the mass proliferation of this technology.

My principal fear is that technologically competent nations such as Russia or China develop viable, robust and simple designs for a microwave or flux generator bombs, which are subsequently marketed to nations like Iran or the DPRK, who in turn reverse engineer the technology and dump it into the terrorist market. Whether the terrorists have component kits for smuggling and assembly in situ, or engineering drawings, the assembly or fabrication of such a weapon is no rocket science, unlike the design effort required to make them work. In a sense this is the 'AK-47 effect' whereby a robust and simple mass production design proliferates and becomes available to all and sundry.

 

5. Have Terrorists already sought to build such a device? - up

 

There is no public evidence to support that proposition. However, this not being known publicly does not preclude the possibility it might be happening or might have happened. Without access to the classified intelligence databases of the world's security agencies, this is not an answerable question.

We can speculate, rightfully so, that Al Qaeda's preoccupation with gory media spectacles of dead, dying or injured victims suggests that a non-lethal weapon with significant economic damage effects would be less attractive than a nuclear, biological or chemical weapon. Certainly Al Qaeda have to date not targeted Western infrastructure and have primarily aimed at propaganda centric targets, eg subway and bus bombings, 911 and such.

The concern we should have, longer term, is that as Western security agencies make it extremely difficult for terrorists to execute their preferred regime of attack, the terrorists will evolve their tactics and shift to infrastructure targets which are much harder to defend than transportation and 'people' targets. The notion that terrorists will retain ossified and ineffective targeting strategies is again wishful thinking. The evolution of the insurgency in Iraq is a prime case study, as the heavy attrition inflicted by coalition forces saw the insurgents shift tactics from small unit infantry style attacks to IED centric standoff ambush tactics, and suicide bomber attacks, with an underlying effort to cripple the national energy infrastructure.

Whether we like it or not, the rules of evolution apply to terrorists and insurgents as they do to microorganisms and antibiotics. The 'dumb' terrorists and insurgents will be attritted, leaving the 'smartest' alive, who in turn will propagate their tradecraft. That we are now seeing the resurgent Taliban adopting the IED centric tactics of the Iraqi insurgents should be considered seriously. Terrorists are an evolving threat and despite numerous documented instances of abject stupidity on their part, a threat which evolutionary pressures will force into further evolution. We only prevail if we evolve tactics faster and stay ahead of the evolutionary curve of the terrorists.

It is worth observing that millenia of warfare show us that the most effective evolution in technique, technology and tactics is nearly always lateral or asymmetric, pitting a strength against an opponent's weakness.  As the West strengthens itself against 'classical' modes of terrorist attack, terrorists will inevitably evolve their targeting strategies, technique and tactics to target weaknesses in the West. The digital infrastructure is one such weakness, which in military and strategy terms is begging to be exploited.

 

6. Are western countries ready to deal with such a threat if it occured? (Banks, Energy providers and so on) - up

 

There is no doubt in my mind that the West has the engineering and technical expertise to deal with this problem effectively, and render critical finance, government and energy infrastructure significantly resistant to electromagnetic attacks. I studied this problem during the late 1990s, in the wake of the E-bomb papers. Replacing the copper information cabling infrastructure with optical fibres would have a huge impact. Adopting an electromagnetic hardening standard for industrial and commercial electronic and computer equipment would also have a huge impact - with the highly desirable collateral effect of reducing the electromagnetic interference emitted by such equipment.

Is there cost involved? Absolutely. But the bigger question is the cost of not doing this, and the collateral benefits of doing it.

Why is my television picture noisier today than twenty years ago? The electromagnetic interference in my suburb has gone up by at least 10 dBs, due to the vast number of household computers and digital appliances. Adopt a binding and well constructed electromagnetic hardening standard and the problem goes away, killing two birds with one stone. Much the same applies with optical fibre cabling, which the telecommunications industry is yet to grapple with at the end user level.

The question is not one of technology, it is one of values, attitudes and priorities within Western bureacracies of the government and corporate variety. As the last decade has demonstrated to the information warfare community, getting these institutional cultures to realign their thinking is a far more difficult task than engineering and funding the technological fixes to the problem.

A good parallel case study is the nuclear EMP debate - the same regime of attack but using nuclear warheads detonated at high altitude, and inflicting damage over vastly greater geographical footprints. This problem was addressed during the Cold War with extensive EMP hardening effort for critical military and government systems. Since then the issue has sunk in priority, while the infrastructure vulnerability has increased by orders of magnitude. As US Air Force strategist Col Gail Wojtowicz commented at a recent Pentagon briefing, 'The one thing that makes me lose sleep is an E-bomb, an EMP'.  Colonel Wojtowicz is not alone.

How many strategists will it take before the issue is taken seriously? If my more cynical colleagues are correct, the number is unbounded, and until a 911 class event occurs, which turns the world upside down, we will collectively be ignored, if not dismissed as 'alarmists' and 'cranks'.

The shame of it all is that we are seeing an almost scripted replay of the Luddite behaviours seen during the 1930s, in the then military context. Whilst this might make great fodder for future history scholars, I would much rather not see a grandiose 'electronic 911' event define my future way of life.

Credits: Dr. Carlo Kopp for his cooperation and his relevant and thorough answers. Dr. Karen Carth for ISRIA.

28 June 2006 - Published online by ISRIA. Reproduction is strictly prohibited without specific and written authorization.

(c) 2006 ISRIA International Security Research & Intelligence Agency, All rights reserved